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a b s t r a c t
There is an international divide between net emissions importers and net emissions exporters,
with industrialised nations mainly falling into the former and emerging economies the latter.
Integrating emissions transfers into climate policy, so as not to disadvantage export-intensive
countries, has been suggested to increase participation in international emissions reduction
commitments. Consumption-based scenarios are presented for the UK identifying the geo-
graphic and sectorial source of emissions to meet future consumer demands given the current
international climate policy landscape. The analysis is applied to the UK yet the discussion is
applicable to international climate policy; assigning national responsibility for global emis-
sions reductions; and extending the mitigation potential for net importing countries. Two
trajectories for UK consumption emissions are calculated in which (1) international reduction
targets are consistent with those pledged today equating to four degrees of temperature rise
and (2) international reduction targets achieve a two degree future. By 2050 it is estimated that
UK consumption emissions are 40–260% greater than UK territorial emissions depending on
the strength of global reduction measures, and assuming the UK meets its 80% reduction in
1990 emissions by 2050 target. Cumulative emissions are presented alongside emissions
trajectories, recognising that temperature rise is directly related to every tonne of carbon
emitted. Whilst this paper argues that the current UK emissions targets underestimate the
UK’s contribution to global mitigation for two degrees, it shows how expanding the focus of
policy towards consumption introduces new opportunities for reduction strategies at scale.
The paper advocates the implementation of consumption-based emissions accounting which
reveals underexploited policy interventions and increases the potential to break down barriers
that exist between industrialised and emerging economies in international climate policy.
# 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci1. Introduction
Drastic cuts in emissions are needed to achieve the global climate
objective of limiting temperature rise to two degrees. The IPCC 5th
assessment report presents the latest scientific evidence on the
relationship between emissions and temperature rise (Stocker
et al., 2013). The report shows that global temperature rises are
approximately proportional to an increase in cumulative carbon
emissions, and not simply end-point targets for 2050, given that* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 113 3435576.
E-mail address: k.a.scott@leeds.ac.uk (K. Scott).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.05.016
1462-9011/# 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an op
org/licenses/by/4.0/).emission pathways can differ (Gillett et al., 2013). This has major
implications for the way climate change targets are implemented.
Contributions to climate policy literature have illustrated the need
to replace end-point targets with cumulative carbon budgets
(Anderson et al., 2008; Anderson and Bows, 2011, 2012; Mein-
shausen et al., 2009; Peters et al., 2013; Gillett et al., 2013; Chicco
and Stephenson, 2012). Cumulative emissions will depend on the
interplay of technology and policy development, and how
effective policy can enable the deployment of low carbon
technologies (Chicco and Stephenson, 2012).en access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
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be assigned across regions is being contested in international
climate negotiations, creating somewhat of a climate ‘impasse’
(Grasso and Roberts, 2014). Currently greenhouse gas emissions
reductions are by-and-large governed by a pledged-based system of
end-point targets benchmarked against territorial emissions in a
handful of regions implemented under the Kyoto Protocol and
Cancun Agreements; however these commitments alone equate to
in the region of four degrees of warming (IEA, 2012). Industrialised
countries, termed Annex I parties,1 have the strongest quantitative
commitments and reporting obligations compared to emerging and
developing economies, non-Annex I parties,2which have qualitative
obligations, more lenient reporting requirements and eligibility for
financial and technological assistance (Depledge, 2009). Countries
are often referred to as Annex B and these are the Annex I countries
that have ratified an emissions reduction target underAnnex B of the
Kyoto Protocol, which in its second phase accounts for less than 15%
of global emissions (Grubb, 2013).
In contrast to territorial emissions accounting, research papers
in the last five-to-ten years have calculated countries’ consump-
tion-based emissions accounts: the emissions embodied in a
country’s final consumption regardless of where they are produced
(for example Davis and Caldeira, 2010; Hertwich and Peters, 2009).
Studies show that industrialised countries tend to be net importers
of emissions whereas emerging and less developed countries tend
to be net emissions exporters. In the first round of Kyoto targets the
emissions saved were completely offset by net emissions transfers
from non-Annex B to Annex B countries (Peters et al., 2011;
Kanemoto et al., 2014), referred to as carbon leakage. However, there
has been little debate on the use of different system boundaries for
international emissions reporting (Peters and Hertwich, 2008), and
efforts to incorporate consumption impacts into international
negotiations have been marginalised (Isenhour and Feng, 2014).
Some now advocate that net emissions importers should take on
responsibility for the ‘additional’ imported emissions generated
outside their territories (Singer et al., 2014).
Studies have shown on the grounds of equity that industria-
lised countries should take on more responsibility than is
currently assigned to mitigate global carbon emissions (Steininger
et al., 2014; Grasso and Roberts, 2014; Raupach et al., 2014;
Athanasiou et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2014). Athanasiou et al. (2014)
even suggest that emissions reductions in Annex I countries
should be greater than the emissions generated within these
countries, meaning they need to take responsibility for reducing
emissions in non-Annex I countries. What has not been explicitly
analysed in the literature is distributional trends in consumption
emissions and whether trends in net traded emissions are likely to
continue within existing climate change frameworks.
The UK, for example has an 80% emissions reduction target on
1990 territorial emissions by 2050, to be achieved through
implementation of its Carbon Plan (HM Government, 2011), and
has interim 5 year carbon budgets (set 4 terms in advance) to try to
ensure a reduction in cumulative emissions towards meeting the
end-point target. It is unclear however how much of the UK’s
cumulative consumption-based emissions would continue to sit
outside the UK in the country of origin, complicating their inclusion
in reduction targets. A few studies have shown for highly aggregated
global regions what consumption-based emissions trajectories are
needed to meet carbon budgets for two degrees, without consider-1 Industrialised OECD member countries and countries deemed
to be economies in transition in 1992.
2 Those deemed as developing in 1992 and recognised as being
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change.ing what they are likely to be given existing climate polices (Bows
and Barrett, 2010; Springmann, 2014). Both references provide high-
level regional analysis without disaggregated trade and sectorial
details. To help inform the evidence gap this paper analyses the
corresponding cumulative emissions of implementation of inter-
national climate policies from a national consumption perspective.
The paper poses four research questions:
(1) Within the existing international climate policy framework,
will the UK continue to be a net importer of emissions to 2050?
(2) In which regions and sectors will UK consumption-driven
emissions be emitted in 2050?
(3) What is the cumulative impact of UK consumption emissions
to 2050?
(4) How can climate policy respond to achieve a reduction in the
cumulative global emissions caused by UK consumption?
The paper is the most comprehensive analysis to date of
consumption-based pathways at the country and sector level. It
extends well established territorial decarbonisation scenarios
from the IPCC’s representative concentration pathways (Stocker
et al., 2013) and the IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives (IEA,
2012) to include trade. While the IPCC provided a detailed analysis
of the embodied emissions of trade as part of the assessment of
past drivers, the literature was not available to consider future
projections within the scenario analysis. This paper is one of the
first to provide a detailed analysis of the future emissions
embodied in trade within the context of the IPCC’s detailed
analysis of territorial emissions. Whilst providing this detailed
consumption-based emissions pathways for the UK, the results
are also discussed in the context of domestic and international
climate policy and the feasibility of achieving a two degree future.
2. Method for determining consumption-
based emissions trajectories for the UK
(2010–2050)
Territorial emissions are published annually in the UK by DECC
(Department for Energy and Climate Change), and the UK is one of
a handful of countries to publish consumption-based emissions
from 1990 to 2013 (DEFRA, 2015; Barrett et al., 2013). National
consumption-based emissions are equal to territorial emissions
minus emissions generated to produce exports (consumed
elsewhere) plus emissions generated elsewhere to produce
imports, and are calculated using multi-region input–output
models. UK consumer demand will not just induce production
in the UK economy but will induce global production activities,
resulting in emissions being released outside of its territory.
Consumption-based accounts lag a few years behind the release of
territorial emissions therefore at the time of this research 2010
was the latest year available.
In this paper consumption-based emissions are projected at 5
year intervals from 2010 to 2050. The modelling framework is built
on collaboration between the authors and the UK Committee on
Climate Change (CCC) who were investigating emissions associ-
ated with future UK consumption patterns, documented in the
CCC’s report Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing
competitiveness risks (CCC, 2013). In addition this paper presents
territorial emissions alongside consumption-based emissions for
comparison and the cumulative impacts of the scenarios are
calculated based on the direct relationship between temperature
rise and carbon emissions (Gillett et al., 2013).
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Environmentally extended multi-region input–output analysis
(EE-MRIOA) can evaluate the emission impacts embodied in goods
and services traded between nations and is recognised as the most
appropriate tool to estimate consumption-based emissions
accounts at the national and supra-national level (Peters, 2010;
Wiedmann, 2009; Peters et al., 2012). EE-MRIOA reallocates
production emissions, which are point source emissions from
sectors within a country’s territory, to the destination country of
the final consumer through complex international trade flows
(Peters, 2008). Direct household emissions for heating and
transport are added onto the account as they are not allocated
to an industry sector.
Using input–output analysis, consumption emissions (F) are
given by F = fxLy, where fx is the direct carbon intensity of
production sectors, L is the effect of trade transactions (known as
the Leontief inverse), and y is the volume and composition of final
consumption. Carbon intensities for production sectors ( fx) are
calculated by dividing direct sector emissions ( f) by the sector’s
economic output (X). The Leontief inverse (L) calculates the ratio
of upstream requirements (i.e. goods and services) to produce
each sectors finished products. When multiplied by the vector of
carbon intensities it provides carbon intensities for final products
which includes the direct and indirect emissions produced along
product supply chains to the point of purchase, referred to as total
carbon intensities. Multiplying the total carbon intensities for
domestic and imported products by a country’s final demand for
domestic and imported products (y) determines the emissions
released globally in the production of goods and services
consumed in a nation – its consumption-based emissions
account.
3.1. Scenarios and projections
Two main scenarios are presented, providing different represen-
tative trajectories for UK consumption-based emissions to 2050 in
which (1) international efforts do not go beyond those currently
implemented equating to four degrees of warming, and (2) global
production emissions reduce in line with carbon budgets for a two
degree future. These scenarios will differ in their emissions
embodied in UK imports.Table 1 – Summary of UK consumption emissions projections
Consumption emissions variable Summ
UK production emissions trajectory ( fUK) UK production emissions are 
industry’’ scenario defined by
International production emissions
trajectories ( foverseas)
This is where the two and four d
reductions are achieved consis
reduced from 2010 to 2050 to h
Direct carbon intensities of production
sectors ( fx)
Production emissions are divi
production sectors. The Office
annual economic growth rates
to project economic output in
carbon production intensities
Global trade transactions (L) Global trade transactions betw
the Eora database developed a
product inputs along product s
consumers change which refl
UK final demand (y) The level of UK final demand gr
and imported products increasThe input–output framework is used to link international and
UK emissions reductions with growth in UK final demand via global
trade transactions to calculate the UK’s consumption-based
emissions from 2010 to 2050. One hundred and ten productive
sectors are modelled within the UK and their trade with 26 sectors in
seven global regions outside the UK to meet UK demand are
modelled: OECD Europe (excluding UK), non-European OECD,
Russia, China, India, Rest of Asia and Rest of World. Each variable
in the input–output model described in Section 3.1 is projected at 5
year intervals from 2010 to 2050 to generate two consumption based
emissions trajectories. Emissions at 5 year intervals are then
interpolated to estimate cumulative emissions from 2010 to 2050.
Projections for UK territorial emissions are produced separately to
projections for international emissions ( fUK and foverseas). The
assumptions for each variable are summarised in Table 1 and
described in more detail in Appendix A. The resulting consumption-
based emissions trajectories are compared to the UK territorial
target to determine the distance from the territorial target to
achieve a two degree future. The results section presents two
representative trajectories for UK consumption-based emissions to
2050, broken down by sector and import share, and from a
cumulative perspective.
4. Results
Traded emissions results are limited to CO2 only due to data
availability of global emissions; however the UK production
emissions are expressed in CO2e to benchmark against national
targets. UK consumption-based emissions have grown 16% from
1993 to 2010, with imported emissions from outside European
OECD countries rising nearly 60%. Looking forward to 2050,
implementation of domestic and international mitigation policies
drives absolute emissions associated with the UK down. Fig. 1
shows results for UK production and consumption emissions. The
two trajectories for consumption emissions represent the two
scenarios which consider (1) only the current Cancun Agreements
consistent with four degrees of temperature rise (line with
diamonds) are implemented, and (2) imports are produced in a
world where global mitigation is compatible with limiting warming
to two degrees (line with triangles). The UK has already complied
with the first round of Kyoto targets set under the UNFCCC and is
well underway to comply with the second phase target. (more detail is provided in Appendix A).
ary of scenario assumptions 2010–2050
reduced 80% from 1990 levels by 2050 following the ‘‘Barriers in
 the CCC (2012, p. 46).
egree scenarios are distinguished. (1) Only currently pledged emissions
tent with four degrees of temperature rise, and (2) global emissions are
ave a 66% probability of limiting temperature rise to two degrees.
ded by projected economic output to describe the carbon intensity of
 for Budget Responsibility (OBR) projections were used to project UK
 and IMF (International Monetary Fund) and other sources were used
 the seven trading regions. Both scenarios achieve improvements in
.
een sectors and countries destined for UK consumers are taken from
t the University of Sydney (Lenzen et al., 2012, 2013). The share of
upply chains are assumed to remain constant, however sales to final
ects changes in the structure of the global economy.
ows in line with trends over the past 20 years, with demand for domestic
ing at an average annual growth rate of 1.9% and 2.75%, respectively.
Fig. 1 – Emissions trajectory for the UK to 2050 (UK production emissions are in Mt CO2e and import emissions are in Mt CO2).
Fig. 2 – Share of UK consumption emissions by sector of origin
in 2010 and 2050 under a two and four degree scenario.
Sectors are disaggregated by their domestic and overseas
location with the second transparent colour segment
representing the overseas proportion. (For interpretation of
the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
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by emissions generated in other regions to meet UK demand. Even
with strong global mitigation the UK could continue to be a net
importer of emissions in 2050 with consumption emissions
estimated to be 43% higher than the 80% reduction target,
increasing to two and a half times the target (257%) if only
current internationally pledged reductions were implemented
(see Fig. 1).
If strong international abatement efforts towards a two
degree future are achieved, emissions generated in the energy
sector become a tenth of what they are in 2010, changing the
sector profiles considerably by 2050. Emissions generated in the
global energy sector are anticipated to contribute an 11% share
to UK consumption-based emissions in 2050 compared to 41%
today. The share of emissions is shifted to manufacturing and
transport services, where there are more barriers to technology
deployment, each estimated to represent nearly a 40% share by
2050. If countries fail to achieve the required reductions, current
international emission reduction commitments would mean
the share of UK imported emissions climbs to nearly 80%
(the transparent colours in Fig. 2), with a higher share of the
increase in imported emissions being produced in non-Annex I
countries.
The sum of the bars in Fig. 3 show the cumulative emissions
between 2010 and 2050 (blue bars) compared to a baseline
situation whereby it is assumed 2010 emission remained
constant at 2010 levels to 2050 to give a measure of avoided
cumulative emissions (red bars). From a production perspective
over 25 GtCO2e would have been generated by UK industries and
just over 11 Gt (44%) would be avoided by meeting the 80%
reduction target. From a consumption perspective 33.5 GtCO2(e)
would have been generated, 42% from industries overseas. Only
about 10 Gt (30%) would be avoided in a four degree future,
compared to 14 Gt (41%) in a two degree future. Imported
emissions add more than 9 Gt CO2 to the cumulative account, and
a further 4 Gt CO2 without a global deal to strengthen current
emission reduction commitments.5. Discussion and policy recommendations
The results of this analysis emphasise that unilateral climate
policies can be hampered by carbon leakage. Half of the UK’s
cumulative consumption-based emissions sit outside the UK in
the country of origin, and increasingly within non-Annex I
countries, which is of mounting concern without their inclusion
in international reduction targets. We illustrate how net imported
emissions could increase UK production emissions in the region of
40% to nearly 260% depending on the strength of international
mitigation efforts in 2050. This assumes compliance of UK carbon
budgets and currently pledged emission targets; however recent
analysis raises concerns for whether UK policy is even enough to
achieve its fourth carbon budget (CCC, 2014).
Fig. 3 – Accumulated and avoided emissions for scenarios from a production and consumption perspective from 2010 to 2050.
Avoided emissions are equal to the cumulative emissions from 2011 to 2050 if emissions stabilised at 2010 level minus the
cumulative emissions in the two and four degree futures. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure text, the reader
is referred to the web version of this article.)
3 Whilst not in the UK’s officially reported territorial emissions,
these are included in the 80% reduction trajectory modelled in
Fig. 1. This is termed production emissions, not territorial, to
identify that emissions from aviation and shipping are included.
If these additional emissions were included in the territorial ac-
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have been proposed to prevent carbon leakage from making
unilateral policies ineffective. One of the most widely discussed
options is carbon border adjustments where the carbon content of
imported products from non-regulated (or weaker regulated)
regions is taxed at the emissions price of the regulating region
and emission payments for exports to non-regulating countries are
rebated (Bohringer et al., 2012a,b, 2014; Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012).
Whilst generally but not exclusively thought of as being the most
effective means of cutting leakage, they have been found to
intensify regional inequalities by penalising the high exporting
countries and may be in breach world trade agreements (Atkinson
et al., 2011; Bohringer, 2014; Li et al., 2013). The distributional
impacts could be reduced if tariff revenues were redirected towards
the exporting countries (Bohringer et al., 2012a), and low carbon
technology transfers from regulated to unregulated regions enabled
developing countries to compete by producing carbon equivalent
products. The discussion below identifies options for the UK, and
other industrialised nations, for mitigating emissions embodied in
their imports, without unfairly taxing export economies.
5.1. Revising the UK’s emissions reduction target
From a consumption perspective the UK generates more emissions
abroad than it statutes for. This is not an argument to cease trade to
the UK as this in itself would not necessarily reduce global emissions
(Jakob and Marschinski, 2013), but to extend the scope of emission
reductions to reflect the UK’s position as an industrialised global
consumer. With industrialised nations secured into a legally
binding mitigation framework, strengthening their commitments
by extending their carbon budget framework to include net
emissions embodied in trade could make reduction targets for
high-exporting (less industrialised) economies more palatable. To
demonstrate the scale of such an initiative, it is estimated that in
2050 the UK drives an additional volume of emissions of between 68
and 251 CO2 outside its territory depending on global mitigation
efforts. Subtracting these figures from the existing 2050 target of 160
Mt CO2e would result in the UK target being reduced to at least 91 Mt
CO2e (equating to an 89% reduction on 1990 territorial emissions, 805
Mt CO2e), to having negative emissions of 92 Mt CO2e by 2050.
5.2. Expanding the focus of climate policy
To achieve the same intended ‘climate outcome’ of the existing
territorial target, which is dependent on cumulative emissions,countries with high consumption-based emissions could be given
tighter carbon budgets. There are three broad options in which to
achieve greater reductions without taxing exporters: (1) strength-
en reduction efforts within the national territory, (2) reduce
emissions in countries outside one’s territory, and (3) reduce and/
or alter resource consumption; of which there are benefits and
disadvantages of each.
5.2.1. Increasing domestic emissions reductions
The UK could strengthen its domestic reduction efforts, however
the assumptions employed in the scenarios for global and UK
production emissions trajectories are heavily reliant on decarbo-
nisation and technology innovation and deployment. It is assumed
the technologies are available and cost effective to mitigate for two
degrees. Whilst deemed to be technically feasible and within the
political scope of national governments, there are risks and barriers
to widespread technology deployment (Bruckner et al., 2014) and
the transition into practice has not had a promising start. Although
the UK met the first round of Kyoto targets and its first carbon
budget, the evidence suggests this is mainly due to the exclusion of
international aviation and shipping,3 the economic recession, and
generous carbon allowances under the EU ETS. For example less
than 1% of the 7% reduction in UK territorial emission reductions in
2011 is attributable to climate policy (CCC, 2014). The under
ambitious allocation of allowances in the EU ETS coupled with
reduced shares of GDP being spent on energy-related research
(Bowen and Rydge, 2011) has meant there is less incentive to
innovate and the share of energy consumption from renewable
sources remains marginal compared to fossil fuels at 4% of UK
energy consumption (DECC, 2013). With annual emissions reduc-
tion rates of more than four times the global average (1.2%) needed
to 2050, and a diminishing global carbon budget, there is a need to
look at alternative reduction options.
Edenhofer et al. (2015) argue that unilateral policies can be
effective with the implementation of a national carbon price. This
would allow countries to select the policies that work most
efficiently for them, and could pave the way to a global dynamic
hybrid climate regime. Even though they acknowledge that acount the first carbon budget would have been exceeded by 2.5%.
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emissions gap, evidence has shown that other countries are likely to
reciprocate the more ambitious efforts of the lead country (enabled
through, for example shared experiences and technology spill over).
These more flexible bottom-up unilateral policies could be
coordinated into an international framework that is gradually
scaled up over time by countries pledging to increase their effort
conditional on policy support or more ambitious targets in other
countries. Edenhofer et al. (2015) provide examples of linking
regional trading schemes, investing in joint research and develop-
ment initiatives and technology cooperation aiming to harmonise
high standards.
5.2.2. Strengthening effort-sharing agreements
National efforts could be strengthened by effort-sharing agree-
ments linked to climate targets. As alluded to in the previous
paragraph, this includes the transfer of finance, knowledge,
abatement technologies and so forth and therefore allows the UK
to take on more responsibility than what is defined by its territorial
emissions. This was partly the intention of the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) which was set up under the UNFCCC to allow
countries with reduction targets to gain carbon credits for
implementing or financing carbon reduction projects outside their
territory; recognising however in theory that the process needs to
also ensure it benefits the host population (Mathur et al., 2014).
According to Edenhofer et al. (2015), strong leadership and
technology spillover can promote actions in other regions, and it
can enable emissions intensive consumer countries to negate
additional emissions outside of their political jurisdiction. Whilst
this can be argued on the grounds of improved equity, whereby net
emissions importing countries with higher economic capacity take
on responsibility for the impact of their consumption-intensive
lifestyles, CDM projects have not necessarily had the intended
transferral benefits for the host nation (Costa et al., 2013); they have
been unevenly distributed across countries (Rahman and Kirkman,
2015); and it has been hard to prove that the emissions reductions
would not have occurred without the CDM (Erickson et al., 2014).
Therefore this needs to be corrected for such policies to be effective.
5.2.3. Reducing consumption
Greenhousegasmitigationfromchangingconsumptionhasreceived
little attention in climate policy literature (Girod et al., 2014), with the
exception of residential energy efficiency. Consumption changescan
increase mitigation options beyond decarbonisation. Bruckner et al.
(2014) suggest more aggressive energy demand reductions are
needed to meet international climate objectives. Girod et al. (2014)
show the potential of consumer changes in food, shelter, mobility,
goods and services to make a significant contribution to the
international two degree target. Currently UK policy influencing
consumption deals primarily with the energy consumption of
products, stemming from three EU Directives: EU Eco-Design
Directive, EU Energy Labelling Directive and the EU Ecolabel Scheme
(a voluntary measure). Yet there is also untapped potential for
resource efficiency strategies that deal with material and product
demand to drive emission reductions upstream, including those
generated in its trading partners (Barrett et al., 2013).
Barrett and Scott (2012) show the potential for demand-side
strategies applied to non-energy related goods and services4 to
contribute to reducing UK consumer emissions. Strategies can be
adopted by both producers such as lean production and green
procurement, and households such as changing household’s4 The study excluded emissions reductions from energy and
transport.behaviours towards using products for longer and shifting to
service-based consumption instead of ownership, for example
joining a car club. They estimated savings of up to 28% in the non-
energy sectors. These would influence emissions from sectors that
under strong decarbonisation and electrification become the most
significant source of emissions: transport services and
manufacturing.
However, developing countries are dependent on export
markets to generate economic growth to develop their infrastruc-
ture and increase their living standards. Whilst there is a
considerable body of work on degrowth and its implications for
developed economies, it has been hard to find how reduced
consumption in developed economies or border taxes on
developing countries’ exports would impact welfare (Li and
Zhang, 2012) and further exacerbate global inequalities.
6. Conclusions
This paper presents evidence on the regional and sectorial
distributional trends in UK consumption-driven emissions given
existing international climate change frameworks from 2010 to
2050. It argues through an analysis of imported emissions, that
current UK emissions targets underestimate the UK’s contribution
to global mitigation for two degrees. In this research paper two
scenarios were investigated that project UK consumption-based
emissions to 2050. These consider emissions embodied in UK
imports and discount emissions embodied in exports which are
assigned to the purchasing country. A few studies have shown for
highly aggregated global regions the consumption-based emissions
trajectories that would be required to meet carbon budgets for two
degrees. These are not based on current reduction targets and or
pledges, nor do they indicate how emissions will shift between
sectors. This paper investigates national representative pathways
for UK consumption-based emissions given (1) current international
emissions reductions pledges and (2) strong global mitigation efforts
aligned with two degrees, implemented mainly through country-
wide energy measures and carbon capture and storage. Further
analysis testing the sensitivity of the scenario assumptions would
increase confidence in the results.
The UK is likely to remain a net importer of emissions. The origin
of emissions shifts from energy production to transport and
manufacturing, which are harder to mitigate. Under the scenarios
for two and four degrees, UK consumption is anticipated to generate
20 to 24 Gt cumulative CO2 between 2010 and 2050, compared to 14
Gt CO2e from a production perspective. It is estimated that in the
region of 46–55% would be emitted outside UK political jurisdiction.
These percentages are higher when looking at the 2050 end-point
only (46–76%). Whilst researchers have argued for industrialised
countries to take stronger steps to mitigate global emissions on the
basis of historic cumulative emissions, present consumption
emissions and financial capacity, this paper shows that these
distributional issues could prevail even with global mitigation for
two degrees, at least this has been found to be the case in the UK.
Global mitigation requires immediate and unprecedented
reductions in carbon intensities and strong international collabo-
ration, particularly towards countries with less financial and
technical capabilities. Current territorial policies in developed
countries such as the UK are most probably inadequate to deal
with the emissions released globally in the production of goods for
their consumption. To meet cumulative budgets, the literature
suggests that industrialised countries are likely to need to increase
their annual rate of carbon reactions; more effectively transfer
technology, finance and knowledge to non-Annex I countries; and
Fig. 4 – A climate policy framework for reducing net imported
emissions.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 5 2 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 5 0 – 1 5 7156reduce their demand for products (see Fig. 4). In doing so (and
somewhat relying on other Annex I countries take similar actions),
evidence suggests this will enable non Annex-I countries to
reciprocate emissions reductions without risking their economic
development by retaining a certain degree of competitive edge.
Such unilateral policies and agreements can harness a more flexible
international climate change framework that is scaled up in time.
Whilst the analysis supports the finding that a mitigation
framework based on consumption emissions would benefit net
exporters in terms of emissions reduction, because a share of its
export emissions will be the responsibility of the final consuming
country, the policy responses from net importers could have
economic implications for the exporting countries. Further research
however is needed on the regional economic and social con-
sequences of reducing consumption, particularly in developing
economies, so as not to impede their development.
The conclusions of this paper need not be alarming for the
policy community. International effort-sharing agreements in the
form of the Clean Development Mechanism, for example have
shown to be environmentally effective (despite not achieving the
desired level of technology transfers). Decarbonisation policy in
the UK is well defined; yet changing the focus of policy towards
consumption introduces new opportunities for reduction strate-
gies at scale. Using consumption-based emissions accounting as a
complementary tool to production accounting increases the levers
available to policy makers with the potential to provide shorter-
term measures whilst waiting for the wide deployment of low
carbon technologies. With more systematic research on con-
sumption-based policies on the rise, demand-side measures are a
real contender to relieve pressure on large-scale reductions. Given
the increasing share of imported emissions in the UK’s account,
and the political and technological uncertainty of decarbonisa-
tion, making consumption-based accounting mandatory gives us
the greatest chance to be armed with responses faced with the
increasing danger of climate change and could be the catalyst to
unlock barriers in international negotiations.
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